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PENNSYLVANIA PARAMOURS: SEISIN
AND THE OTHER WOMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment shall explore the extent of the property inter-
est held by a surviving spouse in the property which a decedent
had attempted to hold as a tenant by the entireties with a third
party.' The extent of such a property right has never been re-
solved by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 2 This Comment
shall first consider the nature of the estate created when a mar-
ried person attempts to acquire property as a tenant by the en-
tireties with someone other than his spouse.3 Thereafter, the ap-
plicability of the spousal elective share provided in Section 11 of
the Estates Act of 1947, as amendment, will be discussed. 4 Be-
cause Section 11 applies to both real and personal property, 5 this
Comment will consider both classes of property. The quantitative
share of the jointly owned property available to the surviving
spouse will be determined along with the ancillary question of
whether an election under Section 11 deprives an intestate's spouse
of any rights under the Intestate Act of 1947.7 Finally, the prob-
lem created when a decedent owns United Savings Bonds as a
joint tenant with the right of survivorship with someone other
than his spouse will be given special consideration.8
II. JOINT OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA
Among the common law forms of joint ownership of property
recognized in Pennsylvania are the tenancy in common, the joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship, and the tenancy by the
1. This Comment's somewhat tongue in cheek title is suggested by
the fact that the majority of cases which have arisen in the area to be dis-
cussed have involved participants in the "eternal triangle." See, e.g., cases
cited notes 37 to 69 and accompanying text infra. It should be noted
that the legal principles involved in the "paramour" situation are also
applicable to "non-paramour" attempts to create an entireties estate be-
tween unmarried persons. See, Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co. v.
Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968).
2. Righter v. Righter, 442 Pa. 428, 275 A.2d 4 (1971).
3. See notes 36 to 69 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 70 to 89 and accompanying text infra.
5. See note 74 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 90 to 105 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 105 to 109 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 109 to 114 and accompanying text infra.
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entireties. Each of these joint ownership concepts involves qual-
itative differences.'0 Because it is essential to determine the
quality of the estate resulting when a married person 'attempts to
form a tenancy by the entireties with someone other than his
spouse before any consideration of the spouse's interest in that es-
tate can be made, certain qualitative incidents of each of the avail-
able forms of joint ownership must be explored.1
A. Tenancy In Common
Each co-owner in a common tenancy holds a right to possess
the entire common property, 12 but such tenant in common has no
right to the sole possession. 13 Among the common tenants, the
only distinctive feature of the tenancy is a severally vested
right to a unity of possession.' 4 The sole limitation upon any co-
tenant's use of the common property is his duty to exercise his
rights without interfering with his co-tenants in the exercise of
their co-equal rights to the property.' 5 Subject to his duty to not
prejudice the rights of his co-tenants, a tenant in common may
alien his interest in the common property at will.16 The undivided
interest of a co-tenant passes, upon his death, through his es-
tate either according to his will or by the law of intestate succes-
sion.' 7 Survivorship was once an inherent incident of any joint
tenancy including the tenancy in common.' 8 However, by virtue
of an early Pennsylvania statute,19 a survivorship estate is no
9. See notes 12 to 34 and accompanying text infra; A discussion of
all the variant forms of joint ownership available in Pennsylvania is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. See 14 PA. LAW ENCYC. Estates in
Property §§ 21-51 (1959).
10. See notes 12 to 34 and accompanying text infra.
11. A complete discussion of all qualitative differences among the
three joint estates is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a detailed
treatment, see 4 THOMPSON, REAT PROPERTY §§ 1770 to 1833 (1961); 14 PA.
LAW ENCYC. Estates in Property §§ 21 to 51 (1959).
12. Speer v. Burns, 173 Pa. 77, 34 A. 212 (1896).
13. McKinley v. Peters, 111 Pa. 283, 3 A. 27 (1886).
14. Frederick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
15. Peterson v. McNeely, 125 Pa. Super. 55, 189 A. 765 (1937).
16. J.M. Shober Farms v. Merrill, 16 Som. 355, af'd 179 Pa. Super.
446, 115 A.2d 384 (1954).
17. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 121 (1950).
18. Lafayette v. Brinham, 363 Pa. 360, 69 A.2d 130 (1950).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 121 (1950):
If partition be not made between joint tenants, whether they be
such as might have been compelled to make partition or not, or
of whatever kind the estates or thing holden or possessed be, the
parts of those who die first shall not accrue to the survivors, but
shall descend or pass by devise, and shall be subject to debts,
charges, curtesy or dower, or transmissible to executors or admin-
longer created unless the parties clearly indicate an intent to in-
clude the incident of survivorship. The practical effect of the
Act of 1812 is to raise a presumption that whenever a conveyance
of property is made or two or more unmarried grantees, absent a
clear intent to the contrary, the grantees take as tenants in com-
mon.
2 0
B. Joint Tenancy With Right of Survivorship
The joint tenancy with right of survivorship differs from
the tenancy in common in that the joint tenancy is a single es-
tate arising from one instrument or one joint action of the tenants.21
The joint property is owned by all the tenants.2 Each tenant
has an equal right to use, possess, and enjoy the entire joint es-
tate during his life.2 3 The joint tenancy is created by the coinci-
dence of the unities of possession, interest, title and time.2 4 A
tenancy in common, on the other hand, arises from the existence
of a sole unity of possession. 25 Upon the death of any joint ten-
ant, his right to the estate expires through the feature of survi-
vorship and the other joint tenants are no longer restrained by the
interest of the decedent. 26 The surviving joint tenants take free
of all claims of the deceased tenant's heirs and creditors.2 7 A joint
tenant may, however, freely alien or forfeit his undivided frac-
tional interest. Creditors of a joint tenant may attach his interest
during his life.
28
C. Tenancy By The Entireties
The tenancy by the entireties arises from the common law doc-
trine that a husband and wife are a legal unity.29 The estate is
istrators, and be considered to every other intent and purpose in
the same manner as if such deceased joint tenants had been ten-
ants in common: Provided always, That nothing in this act shall
be taken to affect any trust estate. 1812, March 31, P.L. 259,
5 Sm.L. 395, § 1.
20. Lafayette v. Brinham, 363 Pa. 360, 69 A.2d 130 (1950); Arnold v.
Jack's Executors, 24 Pa. 57 (1854).
21. Haggerty's Estate, 311 Pa. 503, 166 A. 580 (1933).
22. Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 128 A. 497 (1925).
23. Philadelphia & R.R. v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 36 Pa.
204 (1860).
24. Sheridan v. Lucy, 395 Pa. 306, 149 A.2d 444 (1959); Cochrane's
Estate, 342 Pa. 108, 20 A.2d 305 (1941); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings &
Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938).
25. Frederick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
26. Haggerty's Estate, 311 Pa. 503, 166 A. 580 (1933).
27. Mori's Estate, 318 Pa. 261, 178 A. 492 (1935); In re O'Donnell's
Estate, 54 Lack. Jur. 192, 53 Pa. D. & C. 573, 3 Fiduciary 415 (1953).
28. See generally Falconer v. American Oil Co., 136 Pa. Super. 598,
8 A.2d 418 (1936).
29. United States v. 246 Acres of Land, 78 F. Supp. 377 (W.D. Pa.




only available to married persons,30 and is thus created by the
coincidence of the unities of possession, interest, title, time and mar-
riage.8 1 The tenancy by the entireties includes an incident of sur-
vivorship similar to that found in the joint tenancy with the right
of survivorship.32 An entireties tenant may not alien any inter-
est in the joint property without the joinder of the other tenant.33
Creditors of one entireties tenant may not attach any portion of
the common property during the life of the other tenant.
4
Although certain similarities exist among the three joint
ownership concepts discussed, each of the estates involves char-
acteristics which distinguish it from the others. The determination
of the estate actually created when a married person attempts to
create a tenancy by the entireties with someone other than his
wife has created problems for the Pennsylvania courts.
35
III. THE ESTATE CREATED WHEN UNMARRIED PERSONS ATTEMPT
To TAKE PROPERTY As TENANTS By THE ENTIRETIES
As noted at the outset of this Comment, it is not uncommmon
for unmarried persons to attempt to take property as tenants by
the entireties. An entireties estate, however, cannot be created
in the absence of the unity of marriage.3 6 A proper determina-
tion of the actual estate created by an invalid attempt to acquire
property as tenants by the entireties involves a consideration of
the qualitative differences among the available forms of joint own-
ership, the Act of 1812, and public policy.
The first case to present this precise issue before the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was Maxwell v. Saylor17 Maxwell, a mar-
30. Thornton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11, 194 A. 897 (1937); Frederick v.
Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
31. See Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 A. 172 (1934); Fred-
erick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
32. In re Gallagher's Estate, 55 Dauph. 386, affd 352 Pa. 475 (1945);
Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938).
33. Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 A. 172 (1934).
34. See, e.g., Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3rd Cir. 1952); Sterrett
v. Sterrett, 401 Pa. 583, 166 A.2d 1 (1961); Miami Nat'l Bank v. Willens,
410 Pa. 505, 190 A.2d 438 (1963); McGary v. Lewis, 374 Pa. 173, 119 A.2d
497 (1956); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A.
624 (1938); Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 A. 81 (1907).
35. See Frederick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802
(1949); In re Metcalfe's Estate, 8 Adams 82, 17 Fiduciary 68 (Pa. C.P.
1966); Pastor v. Tomal, 2 Bucks 60 (Pa. C.P. 1952); see also Schultz v.
Schultz, 83 Montg. 262 (Pa. C.P. 1964) and cases cited notes 36 to 69
infra.
36. Simpson v. Simpson, 404 Pa. 243, 172 A.2d 168 (1961).
37. 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948).
ried man, and his paramour took real property under a deed which
described them as husband and wife. The deed expressly pur-
ported to create a tenancy by the entireties. After Maxwell's
death, his wife and daughter, as his heirs, brought a bill in equity
seeking a partition of the property. The wife and daughter claimed
a right as Maxwell's legal heirs to a one-half interest in the prop-
erty on the theory that the ineffective attempt to create the es-
tate by the entireties had, in fact, created a tenancy in common.
The paramour claimed to own the property outright on the theory
with the right of survivorship.35 The trial court found for the wife
and daughter and ordered the partition.39 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the
intention of the parties was the key to determining what estate
had been created. 40 Noting that the joint tenancy with the right
of survivorship contains all of the incidents of an estate by the en-
tireties except marriage, the court ruled that the intent manifested
by the attempted creation of an entireties estate was at least a suf-
ficient intention to create a survivorship estate which would meet
the requirements of the Act of 1812.41 Dictum in the majority opin-
ion speaks of the equity of awarding the property to the paramour
because she in fact had paid the entire purchase price for the
land.
42
Mr. Justice Stearne was one of three justices who dissented
from the Maxwell decision.43  His tightly reasoned dissent raised
the proposition that the false statement of the parties' relation-
ship, inherent in the attempted creation of the entireties estate, re-
sulted in a complete failure of seisin. The dissent noted that the
quality of seisin in an entireties estate is markedly different from
the seisin of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Justice
Stearne pointed out that a joint tenant with right of survivorship
is regarded as a tenant of the whole only for the purpose of tenure
and survivorship while an entireties tenant is a tenant of the whole
for all purposes. 44 The difference in the seisin of the two estates is
exemplified by the varying rights of alienation and creditor respon-
sibility inherent in a tenancy by the entireties as compared with
38. Id. at 95-96, 58 A.2d at 355.
39. Maxwell v. Saylor, 63 Montg. 295 (Pa. C.P. 1947).
40. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 97, 58 A.2d 355, 356 (1948).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 97, 58 A.2d at 356:
In the present case it is especially just and proper that the de-
fendant be conceded the right of survivorship since every dollar of
the money invested in the property was hers and not Maxwell's;
it is inconceivable that the parties could have intended, under
such circumstances, that upon Maxwell's death she should be de-
prived of any part of the title to a property which was acquired
solely by the fruits of her own labor.
43. Id. at 98-105, 58 A.2d at 356-60; Justices Drew and Linn joined in
Justice Stearne's dissent.
44. Id. at 98-99, 58 A.2d at 356-57.
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a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.45 Justice Stearne con-
cluded that the failure of seisin required a finding that Maxwell
and his paramour took, at best, as tenants in common. 40 The dis-
sent also noted that even the "intent of the parties" test applied
by the majority required a finding that Maxwell and his para-
mour had established no more than a tenancy in common. Jus-
tice Stearne reasoned that the requirement of an express intent to
create a survivorship in the Act of 1812 could not be satisfied by
an invalid attempt to create an entireties estate. 47 To support
his conclusion, Justice Stearne distinguished the cases upon which
the majority opinion was based because they involved an express
indication of an intention to create a survivorship estate.48
Maxwell is an intriguing decision. It is the dissent rather than
the majority opinion which satisfies the rigid requirements of
property law as well as the public policy considerations one would
expect the court to favor. The practical effect of the Maxwell de-
cision was to leave Maxwell's widow with no possibility of shar-
ing in a major asset of her husband's estate. The "equity" in
awarding the property to the paramour in derogation of the wife's
rights because the paramour purportedly paid the full purchase
price is questionable. 49 Despite the infirmities which can be
found in the opinion in retrospect, Maxwell v. Saylor has be-
come the established rule in Pennsylvania.
The "intent of the parties" test announced in Maxwell was em-
ployed to support a diametrically opposite result in Teacher v.
Kijurina.5 0 In Teacher, a man and a woman lived together for
eighteen years as husband and wife althought the woman was le-
gally married to another man. During the course of their cohabi-
tation, the unmarried couple took property under a deed to "Nick
Kijurina and Sarah his wife". When Sarah died, her executrix
45. See text accompanying notes 21-36 supra.
46. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 105, 58 A.2d 355, 360 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion).
47. Id. at 104, 58 A.2d at 359.
48. Id. See also Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 A. 733 (1934);
Michael v. Lucas, 152 Md. 512, 137 A. 287 (1927).
49. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 100, 58 A.2d 355, 358 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion, Stearne, J.):
I am unimpressed with the supposed equity that it was the wo-
man's money which purchased the real estate. This was not
proven. Decision on this point was expressly withheld by the
court.
Maxwell joined in giving a bond and mortgage to secure payment on the
purchase price. Id. at 96, 58 A.2d at 255.
50. 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950).
brought a bill in equity claiming the decedent to have held a one-
half interest in common which passed under a devise of real
estate to the decedent's sister, brother-in-law, nephew and niece.5'
After deciding that the "intent of the parties" test enunciated
in Maxwell was applicable, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reasoned:
If we regard the addition of the words 'his wife' as a mere
description or surplusage because of the settled rule that the
word cannot operate to create a tenancy by entireties un-
less the pretended relationship is one of truth and fact,
then at common law such a conveyance would have been
construed as a joint tenancy. But the common law rule
was changed by the Act of 1812 .... This Act has been
consistently construed as abolishing the incident of survi-
vorship but not as forbidding the creation of an estate
with the same attribute of survivorship as a joint ten-
ancy at common law .... But to do so the intent must
clearly appear in order to overcome the presumption arising
from the statute that survivorship is not intended.
52
In granting the disputed property to collaterals rather than the
surviving "spouse", the court concluded that the inclusion of a de-
scription which is factually inaccurate is insufficient to meet the
intent required by the Act of 1812. The court emphasized that the
conveyance in Teacher involved no express use of the phrase
"tenancy by the entireties." Based upon this distinction, the court
was able to rule that no survivorship estate had been created
without overruling Maxwell.53 The phrase "tenants by the entire-
ties" has thus been elevated to a "magic word" status in Pennsyl-
vania property law. On the basis of a draftsman's use or non-use of
this phrase Pennsylvania courts regulate the property rights of in-
dividuals regardless of the dictates of formal property law reason-
ing.
The reasoning and holding in Maxwell was affirmed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bove v. Bove.5 4 In Bove, a man
and woman began living together as husband and wife despite an
51. Id. at 482-83, 76 A.2d at 199.
52. Id. at 487-88, 76 A.2d at 201.
53. Id. at 489, 76 A.2d at 202:
In the case before us there is no such indication of intent. Of
course it is arguable that the mere use of the words "his wife" of
itself would imply an intent to create an entireties estate. And
it is true that if such language without more were used to convey
to grantees who were in fact husband and wife an estate by the
entireties would be created. But we cannot carry the implication
of intent that far in a case where the parties are not married
for they may have been motivated solely by a desire to make a
public record conform to the pretended relationship. We cannot
safely infer therefore than an estate by entireties was intended
by these parties. Hence the clear expression of intent necessary to
satisfy the Act of 1812 is lacking. In Maxwell v. Saylor we
went as far as we could go and that case must not be extended
beyond its facts. (emphasis by the court)
54. 394 Pa. 627, 149 A.2d 67 (1959).
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existing marriage between the woman and another man. Bove, the
"husband", conveyed two parcels of land through a straw party
to himself and the woman who was described in the deeds as "his
wife". Both deeds purported to create an estate "as tenants by
the entireties." After Bove's death, his executor instituted an ac-
tion in ejectment against the woman. The executor sought to se-
cure an undivided one-half interest in the two tracts of real estate
on the theory that an estate in common had been created in each of
the two conveyances. 55 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, re-
lying upon Maxwell, found that the intention of the parties in
Bove, as expressed in both conveyances, was sufficient to create a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship.5 6 The court cited Teacher
in dictum to emphasize that, despite any indication to the con-
trary in Maxwell, it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the
language of the conveyance rather than which person paid for
the property which determines the quality of the estate taken. The
factual variable leading to the contrasting holdings in Teacher and
Bove is the use in Bove of the express term "tenancy by the entire-
ties" in the deeds whereas in Teacher the only reference was to
"his wife".
5 7
That the court will place determinative emphasis on the use
of the term "tenancy by the entireties" was clearly indicated in
First Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Porter.58 Porter is
similar to Teacher in that it involves a deed to an unmarried cou-
ple which merely describes them as "man and wife."5 In ruling
that the couple took as tenants in common, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania cited Maxwell, Teacher and Bove for the following
proposition:
The deed . . . did not operate to create an estate by
the entireties. . . . Nor did it create a joint tenancy or
55. Id. at 627-29, 149 A.2d at 67-68.
56. Id. at 630, 71 A.2d at 68. Bove might well be regarded as
saving Maxwell from being limited to its facts by Teacher. The Bove
court interprets Teacher as approving and declaring Maxwell to be a
"basic rule" in the law of Pennsylvania. It must be noted, however, that
in Bove the court went to great lengths to show that Bove was factually
on point with Maxwell. For example:
Although that fact is wholly irrelevant to the legal question in-
volved . . . , we mention it at this time in order to point out that,
except for the fact that the purchase money for the properties came
from the non-survivor of the two joint tenants, this case cannot be
distinguished on its facts from Maxwell v. Saylor....
394 Pa. 627, 629, 71 A.2d 67, 68.
57. Compare, Teacher v. Kijurina, 365 Pa. 480, 76 A.2d 197 (1950)
with Bove v. Bove, 394 Pa. 627, 149 A.2d 67 (1959).
58. 408 Pa. 236, 183 A.2d 318 (1962).
59. Id. at 238, 183 A.2d at 321.
dual ownership with the right of survivorship. The inten-
tion must be clearly expressed in the deed to be effective
where the grantees are not, in fact, man and wife. A deed
which merely describes the grantees as man and wife, when
in fact they are not, is not sufficient.0°
It is not easy to determine the reason for the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's decision to rely upon an express use of the term
"tenancy by the entireties" as the exclusive factor indicative of the
intent necessary to convert an improper entireties estate into a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. It could be argued that
if persons honestly believe themselves to be married they will ex-
pressly attempt to take the appropriate estate. Although this ra-
tionale may be satisfactory from a public policy standpoint, it
does not withstand legal analysis. It is a well established rule
that whenever persons who are in fact man and wife attempt to
take property by any estate other than entireties, the fact of their
marriage will convert their ownership into an entireties estate by
operation of law.61 It must also be noted that the parties in Max-
well and Bove could not have entertained an honest belief that
they were lawfully married. In Maxwell, the man lived within a
few miles of his legal wife and family. 62 In Bove, the woman's
knowledge of the validity of her prior marriage is evidenced by the
fact that she successfully sued her husband for divorce twenty
years after beginning cohabitation with Bove.63
It is submitted that a close reading of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania's reasoning in Michael Estate64 indicates that the
court's choice of the "tenancy by the entireties" terminology is
based upon expendiency rather than any legal or equitable con-
siderations. Michael Estate involved a deed which provided:
Between Joyce E. King, widow, of Milton, Northumberland
County, State of Pennsylvania, party of the first part, Harry
L. Michael and Bertha M. Micaheal, his wife, tenants by
the entireties and Ford W. Michael and Helen M. Michael,
his wife, as tenants by the entireties, with the right of sur-
vivorship, of Hughsville, Lycoming County, Pennsylvania,
parties of the second part. 65
The court was asked to determine whether the conveyance created
not only a tenancy by the entireties between each grantee man and
wife but also an estate by the entireties or a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship among the four grantees. 00 The court held
60. Id. at 242, 183 A.2d at 323.
61. Only in the face of a clear intent to take an estate other than an
entireties will Pennsylvania courts recognize married persons to hold
property as other than tenants by the entireties. See, e.g., Madden v.
Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 A. 624 (1938).
62. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 95, 58 A.2d 255 (1948).
63. Bove v. Bove, 394 Pa. 627, 629, 149 A.2d 67, 68 (1959).
64. 421 Pa. 207, 218 A.2d 338 (1966).
65. Id. at 208-09, 218 A.2d at 339.
66. Id. at 210, 218 A.2d 340.
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that each man and wife held title to an undivided one-half of the
whole by the entireties but that between the two sets of married
grantees only a tenancy in common was created. The court rea-
soned:
Since the passage of the Act of 1812, the question of sur-
vivorship has become a matter of intent. . . and in order to
engraft the right of survivorship on a co-tenancy which
might otherwise be a tenancy in common, the intent to do so
must be expressed with sufficient clarity to overcome the
statutory presumption that survivorship is not intended.
... Whether or not survivorship was intended is to be
gathered from the instrument and its language . . . but no
particular form of words is required to manifest such in-
tention. . . . The incident of survivorship may be express-
ly provided for in a deed or will or it may arise by neces-
sary implication....
Applying the above stated principles to the instant
facts, we fail to find a sufficiently clear expression of
intent to create a right of survivorship as required by the
case law to overcome the presumption against such a right
arising from the act of 1812 .... The phrase "with right of
survivorship" is capable, as appellant property urges, of at
least three possible interpretations: (1) explanatory of the
one of the incidents of the estate, known as tenancy by
the entirety; (2) explantory of the one tenancy by the en-
tirety, the creation of which it follows or (3) as the ap-
pellee and the lower court contend, indicative of the crea-
tion of the fight of survivorship as between the two sets
of spouses. Any one of these interpretations is a possibil-
ity, but deciding which was intended by the parties would
involve nothing but a mere guess. Such ambiguous termi-
nology falls far short of the clear expression of intent re-
quired to overcome the statutory presumption.
Nowhere in the deed is the term "joint tenants" em-
ployed. To create a right of survivorship, the normal pro-
cedure is to employ the phrase "joint tenants, with a right
of survivorship, and not as tenants in common" in describ-
ing the manner in which the grantees are to take or hold
the property being transferred.6 7
In Michael Estate, the court reaffirmed the "intent of the parties"
test initially set out in Maxwell v. Saylor. However, although the
court said that "no particular form of words is required to mani-
fest such intention," it in fact did require just such a "particular
form of words." Under the guise of comparing the conveyance in
Michael Estate to the "normal" form used to create a survivorship
estate, the court served clear notice of the "particular form of
words" it will accept as sufficient to meet the requirements of the
67. Id. at 212-13, 218 A.2d at 341-42 [citations omitted].
Act of 18 1 2 .1s "Intent," which one would expect to be a factual mat-
ter to be determined by a trial court, is governed by a single factual
test based solely on the language of the conveyance involved.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applies this "factual" test as a
rule of law. The reason the court chose the test it did can be seen
only as a matter of expendiency.
In Maxwell v. Saylor, the court chose to depart from the
formal considerations of property law set forth in Mr. Justice
Stearne's dissent.69 Having discarded the guidelines of tradi-
tional property law reasoning, the court found itself adrift in an
area susceptible of diverse and inconsistent reasoning. To avoid
uncertainty and inconsistency, the court has chosen an admittedly
arbitrary but workable test. Application of that test will, at least,
lead to a degree of decisional certainty and consistency. The con-
clusion which may be drawn from the existing case law is that if an
unmarried couple attempts to take property as tenants by the en-
tireties, they will be rewarded with a survivorship estate if
their conveyance contains the words "tenants by the entireties" or
"as joint tenants with the right of survivorship." On the other
hand, if the conveyance merely describes the couple as "man and
wife" or makes no description of the couple or estate taken what-
soever, the court will find a tenancy in common.
IV. RIGHTS OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE IN PROPERTY HELD By A
DECEDENT As A JOINT TENANT WITH A RIGHT OF
SURVIVORSHIP IN A THIRD PERSON
A. The Existence and Nature of the Spousal Right
If at death a decedent held property with a third person as d
tenant in common, the surviving spouse is entitled to a share of
the common property because the decedent's interest passes
through his estate.70 The Pennsylvania appellate courts have not
determined, however, whether a surviving spouse has any right
to share in property which the deceased spouse owned as a joint
tenant with a right of survivorship in a third person.71 At com-
mon law, the surviving joint tenant would have taken the prop-
erty free from any interest claimed by the decedent's spouse.1
2
However, Section 11 of the Estates Act of 1947, as amended, ap-
plies to:
68. Nowhere in the deed is the term "joint tenants" employed.
To create a right of survivorship the normal procedure is to em-
ploy the phrase "joint tenants, with right of survivorship, and not
as tenants in common" in describing the manner in which the
grantees are to take or hold the properties being conveyed or
transferred. Id. (Emphasis by the court).
69. 359 Pa. 94, 98-105, 58 A.2d 355, 356-60 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
70. PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 20 § 121 (1950).
71. See Righter v. Righter, 442 Pa. 428, 275 A.2d 4 (1971).
72. See cases cited notes 28 and 29 supra.
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A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power
of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or con-
sumption over the principal thereof. .... 73
The term "conveyance" is given a broad meaning in the Es-
tates Act. "Conveyance" is defined as:
[A] n act by which it is intended to create an interest in
real or personal property whether or not the act is intended
to have inter vivos or testamentary operation. Except as
used in section 11, it shall include any act by which a power
of appointment, whenever given is exercised.
7 4
The courts have acknowledged and approved the legislative intent
to use a broad definition of "conveyance" for the purposes of the
Estates Act.7 5 The survivorship incident of the joint tenancy with
right of survivorship makes it impossible for a decedent to have
retained a "power of appointment by will." Therefore, the ques-
tion raised before the common pleas courts has been limited to
whether property held as joint tenants with right of survivorship
is subject to spousal election under Section 11 of the Estates Act
because of the retention of a "power of revocation or consumption
over the principal" by the deceased spouse. The courts which
have considered the question have all found Section 11 to be appli-
cable. The absence of appellate authority makes it necessary to
turn to the decisions of the common pleas and orphans courts
which have considered the issue.
In Longacre v. Hornblower & Weeks,77 a man turned certain
shares of stock over to a stakeholder. The transaction was made
pursuant to a written agreement under which the man and Long-
acre, a woman other than his wife, were joint tenant with right of
survivorship. The joint tenants were each given the express right
to act on behalf of the joint account and to terminate the account.
When the man died, Longacre brought suit against the stake-
holder claiming the property by survivorship. The stakeholder
empleaded the surviving spouse who filed a complaint claiming
a right to take a portion of the property under Section 11. Long-
acre demurred, contesting the application of the Estates Act to the
case.78 The Monroe County court first determined that the broad
definition of "conveyance" required by the Estates Act made the
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.11 (1971 Supp.).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.1 (1971 Supp.).
75. See, e.g., Longacre v. Hornblower & Weeks, 15 Monroe 56, 83 Pa.
D. & C. 259, 3 Fiduciary 419 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
76. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.11 (1971 Supp.).
77. 15 Monroe 56, 83 Pa. D. & C. 259, 3 Fiduciary 419 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
78. Id. at 56-58, 83 Pa. D. & C. at 260-262, 3 Fiduciary at 420.
transfer to the stakeholder a "conveyance" for the purposes of Sec-
tion 11.7 9 The opinion noted that although no power of revocation
or consumption was expressly reserved, such powers are inherent
in the joint tenancy estate. The court reasoned:
One of the incidents of a joint tenancy is the power in either
tenant to sever that tenancy and reacquire rights therein.
By creating a tenancy which carried with it such a power
the husband was retaining some power over the assets con-
veyed. This is certainly a power of revocation pro tanto. It
is probably also a "power of termination" as that phrase
is used in the act. The phrase "power of consumption" has
no settled meaning in the law, and it appears to us that the
legislature was using the word to apply the act to all con-
veyances subject to a power in the transferor to acquire
beneficially the property conveyed.80
The court supported its reasoning by noting that the first case
decided under the Act held the creation of a tentative trust to be
a "conveyance" under Section 11.81 It was there held that although
those who create tentative trust generally retain no powers by
express language, powers of consumption and revocation remain in
the settlor because of the very nature of the transaction.
The Longacre reasoning was approved and applied in Her-
shey Estate. 2 Hershey involved a Section 11 election against
funds in several joint bank accounts created by the decedent with
persons other than his wife. In holding that the surviving spouse
could successfully invoke Section 11 to reach the funds in the joint
accounts, the Fulton County court reasoned:
Whether or not [the decedent] exercised his power to term-
inate the tenancy, he always had the right as between
the parties, to consume his share of the account during his
lifetime. This right to consume a portion of the principal
was just as effective as if he had created a trust retaining
the power to consume one-half of the principal. The con-
veyance would therefore come within the provisions of Sec-
tion 11.83
The Hershey court noted with approval that Longacre interpreted
the legislative intent behind Section 11 to be one of providing broad
protection for the surviving spouse in the joint tenancy situation.
Hagy Estate8 4 illustrates two important facets of the operation
of Section 11 elections. Hagy upheld the claim of a surviving
joint bank account tenant that because the surviving spouse had
produced no evidence that the decedent ever deposited any of his
own funds in the joint account, no "conveyance" under Section
79. Id. at 57, 83 Pa. D. & C. at 261, 3 Fiduciary at 421.
80. Id. at 58, 83 Pa. D. & C. at 262, 3 Fiduciary at 422.
81. Id., 83 Pa. D. & C. at 262, 3 Fiduciary at 423.
82. 1 Adams 160, 10 Fiduciary 390 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
83. Id. at 166-167, 10 Fiduciary at 399.
84. 15 Fiduciary 456 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
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11 was made. Thus, the broad definition of "conveyance" ' 5 was lim-
ited by the court's imposing a standard of proof which must be met
by the surviving spouse in order to successfully claim a Section 11
election. Hagy thus emphasizes the legislature's use of the term
"act" in defining "conveyance" thereby excluding the extension
of Section 11 to property in which a decedent acquired his inter-
est through passive acquiescence to the action of a third party. Hagy,
in effect, reinstates the "contribution" theory expressed in Max-
well v. Saylor wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted
in dictum that the fact that the decedent's paramour had paid the
entire purchase price of the joint property militated against the
existence of any interest therein being available to the surviving
spouse.
8 8
Hagy also illustrates that Section 11 applies to pre-marital con-
veyances. The decedent had made a pre-marital conveyance of real
estate through a straw party to himself and his mother as joint
tenants with a right of survivorship. The surviving spouse was
permitted to exercise a Section 11 election against the real estate so
conveyed even though the conveyance itself had occurred before
marriage. It was held that although the conveyance itself had oc-
curred before decedent married, the nature of the estate created
included an inherent incident of the right to sever the estate which
continued through marriage and until the time of decedent's death.
The continued retention of a right to terminate was held sufficient
to satisfy the definitional requirements of the estate which Section
11 may reach.
8 7
A Section 11 election against a pre-marital conveyance was also
allowed in O'Connell Estate.88 O'Connell involved a joint tenancy
with a right of survivorship created among decedent and his
sisters before decedent's marriage. The O'Connell court reasoned
that any of the joint grantees could have sold an undivided inter-
est in the real estate at any time and that the creditors of any
grantee could have had an execution upon the grantee's interest.
The court noted that either a voluntary sale or an involuntary
sale would have destroyed the survivorship incident. The retained
right to consume was held to pierce through the pre-marital nature
85. See, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.1 (1971 Supp.).
86. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
87. 15 Fiduciary 456, 460-461:
This is the type of retained power which comes within the scope
of Section 11 of the Estates Act and makes the interests of the
decedent available to his widow to the extent of her right to
claim one-fourth of the value of the property. Id.
88. 15 Fiduciary 491 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
of the conveyance and thus entitle the surviving spouse to make a
Section 11 election upon decedent's death. 9
B. Quantative Analysis of a Spouse's Section 11 Share
The careful reasoning of the Longacre, Hershey, Hagy, and
O'Connell courts establishes that the joint tenancy with right of
survivorship is an estate which may be reached by a surviving
spouse through Section 11.90 As originally enacted, however, Sec-
tion 11 contained no express formula for determining the quantita-
tive value of the spousal election.9 1 The statute merely provided
that an estate created by a "conveyance" as defined in the Estates
Act on 1947 could, "at the election of the surviving spouse, be
treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse
is concerned to the extent to which the power has been re-
served .... "92 The actual value of a Section 11 election thus de-
pends upon a determination of the quantitative extent of each
joint tenant's interest in the joint property and of the legal con-
sequences of treating the conveyance as "testamentary."
The extent of each joint tenant's interest in the joint property
is governed by the rule exemplified in American Oil Company v.
Falconer.3 This case involved a bank account opened by a
mother, entirely with her own funds, in the names of herself, her
son, and her daughter. The account was expressly established as a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. While all of the joint
tenants were still alive, one of the son's creditors levied upon the
account, thus severing the joint estate. In determining whether
the creditor had any interest whatsoever in the account, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court concluded that although the son had made
no contribution to the account, his status as a joint tenant with right
of survivorship entitled the creditor to levy upon a full one third
of the account.9 4 Each joint tenant is thus considered to have an
equal interest in the joint property without consideration of the
amount each individual joint tenant contributed. It must be
noted, however, that Section 11 only allows an election against
a "conveyance" of assets. This limitation upon the scope of a Sec-
tion 11 election would logically seem to demand the conclusion
89. Id. at 493-494:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has thrown its protection
around the surviving spouse of a decedent through the enactment
of Section 11 (a) of the Estates Act of 1947, as amended.
When Raymond A. O'Connell married Dorothy O'Connell subse-
quent to the execution of the deed dated July 16, 1958, Dorothy
O'Connell became entitled to the benefits conferred by Section
11 ....
90. See notes 77 to 89 and accompanying text supra.
91. See Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100.
92. Id.
93. 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1936).
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that a surviving spouse may only elect against the joint property to
the extent to which the decendent "conveyed assets" into the fund 5
The Monroe County Court in Longacre, however, adopted the
Falconer rule."' The Longacre court reasoned:
Under the law of Pennsylvania the husband could, during
his lifetime, have severed this joint tenancy and have re-
turned to himself one half of the property conveyed, but
under the . . . cases he is not entitled to the whole fund
even though he contributed all of the assets.9 7
Although the Falconer rule that a person may obtain an at-
tachable interest in a joint tenancy with no contribution on his
part may be inapplicable to a Section 11 election against joint prop-
erty to which the decedent contributed nothing, the modified
form of the rule employed in Longacre leads to a result which is
consonant with the express language of the statute. In Longacre
the decedent had contributed all of the stock which formed the
joint property elected against. Section 11 expressly allows a sur-
viving spouse to reach property transferred into joint tenancy to the
extent that the decedent had retained power over the transferred
assets. It may thus be concluded from the interaction of the
Falconer rule as modified in Longacre and Hagy that a surviving
spouse may exercise a Section 11 election against so much of a joint
estate as is representative of the decedent's interest therein. The
decedent's interest is determined by dividing the value of any
"conveyance" into the fund made by the decedent over which he re-
tained rights or powers by the number of joint tenants. The spouse
is then entitled to the fractional share of the decedent's interest
specified in the statute.99
The original enactment of Section 11 was devoid of any indica-
tion of the consequence the legislature intended to arise from a
"testamentary" treatment of the conveyance.9 9 Longacre applied
the formula for determining a spousal elective share under Section
8 of the Wills Act of 1947.100 After determining that the Section
11 election would apply to one half of the assets conveyed, the Long-
acre court merely said:
94. Id. at 600, 8 A.2d at 418.
95. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
96. 15 Monroe 56, 59, 83 Pa. D. & C. 259, 264, 3 Fiduciary 419, 424
(Pa. C.P. 1952).
97. Id.
98. See notes 90 to 97 and accompanying text supra.
99. See Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100.
100. 15 Monroe 56, 58-59, 83 Pa. D. & C. 259, 263-64, 3 Fiduciary 419,
423-24 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
Under the act the widow is entitled to treat the creation
of the account as testamentary as to one half thereof. Since
there are no children she is entitled to one half of this por-
tion of the account. She is thus entitled to one fourth of the
account.10 '
In 1956, the legislature amended Section 11 to provide that the
electing spouse shall be entitled to:
. . . one-third thereof if the conveyor is survived by more
than one child, or by one or more children and the issue
of a deceased child or children, or by the issue of more
than one deceased child, and in all other circumstances
one-half thereof.
10 2
Longacre's application of the Wills Act formula was thus codified
for all post 1956 cases by the amendment. Hershey Estate,0
3
which was decided after the 1956 amendment to Section 11 but
which involved a conveyance to which the amendment did not ap-
ply, 10 4 approved the Longacre application of the Wills Act share
to pre-amendment cases:
The amendment of 1956 (it is not applicable here), in sub-
section (b) provides that where there are no children or
issue or deceased children, the widow shall be entitled to
one-half 'thereof'. 'Thereof' refers to that which precedes
the sub-section and must mean the property conveyed
against which the election is made. We believe that this
amendment indicates the intention of the legislature in the
original Section 11; namely, that the widow would take
the same share of the property conveyed over which a
power is retained, as she would take in the estate of the
testator against whose will she elected to take. In this
case that would be one-half of the one-half of the bank
accounts as to which the decedent retained a power to con-
sume, or one-fourth of the accounts. 0 5
It may be concluded that the surviving spouse is entitled to a share
equal to the share available to a spouse electing against a valid will
under Section 8 of the Wills Act in both pre and post 1956 convey-
ances.
C. Special Problems
It was claimed in Hershey Estate that the widow of an inte-
state who elects under Section 11 is, as is a widow electing against
a valid will, not entitled to the "first twenty thousand dollars in
value and one-half of the balance" awarded a widow under Section
101. Id. at 59, 83 Pa. D. & C. at 264, 3 Fiduciary at 425.
102. See Act of Feb. 17, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1073.
103. 1 Adams 160, 10 Fiduciary 390 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
104. In Hershey the conveyor died on May 23, 1956, which was before
the effective date of the amendments. 1 Adams 160, 166, 10 Fiduciary
390, 391.
105. 1 Adams 160, 167, 10 Fiduciary 390, 401.
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2 of the Intestate Act of 1947.106 The argument was held invalid
by the Hershey court which reasoned:
The difficulty with expectants' position is that the joint
bank accounts were not testamentary and the election of
the widow under section 11 was not an election against
a will. Section 11 permits a conveyance of assets by a
person who retains certain rights therein to "be treated as
a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse is
concerned to the extent to which the power has been re-
served." "Treating" the conveyance as a testamentary dis-
position is merely a device to permit the surviving spouse
to reach assets which are not part of the estate; it does not
change the character of the conveyance or make such as-
sets part of the estate.
Section 8 of the Wills Act applies only to the estate of
any married person who dies testate as to any part of
his estate. Subsection (b) of section 8, defining the share
that the "surviving spouse, upon an election to take against
the will shall be entitled. . . ." In this case decedent
did not die testate as to any part of his estate, and the sur-
viving spouse did not elect to take against a will.
10 7
Although the 1956 amendments to Section 11 did not apply in
Hershey Estate, the decision was made after their enactment and
the Hershey court noted that Section 11 had been amended to re-
quire:
A spouse electing under this section must elect to take
against the will, if he is a beneficiary thereunder, and
against all other conveyances within the scope of subsec-
tion (a) of which he is a beneficiary. 0 8
The court interpreted this amendment as a legislative attempt to
change prior law. The court concluded that had the legislature in-
tended to deny an intestate's widow the statutory sum certain
available under the Intestate Act, it would have so provided. It
thus appears that an intestate's surviving spouse is entitled to the
Intestate share in addition to the Section 11 share regardless of
whether the decedent created the survivorship estate before or af-
ter the 1956 amendments.
It is questionable whether a surviving spouse may elect un-
der Section 11 to take against a decedent's lifetime conveyance of
United States Savings Bonds. Federal law provides a special sur-
vivorship estate for those who wish to hold United States Savings
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1.2 (1971 Supp.).
107. 2 Adams 121, 125, 23 Pa. D. & C.2d 523, 526 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
108. Id.
Bonds as joint tenants.10 9 In Horstman Estate1 0 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted in dictum:
To the almost universally accepted rule of the primacy
of federal regulations over the laws of the individual states
in fixing the ownership of these bonds in surviving co-
owners an exception is generally recognized. If it is es-
tablished that the surviving co-owner of the bond was
guilty of fraud or other inequitable conduct in connection
with the issue or registration of the bond, or, that the pur-
chaser was guilty of inequitable conduct in the purchase
and registration of the bonds, such as acting in fraud of
marital rights, many courts have properly taken the posi-
tion that, even though the federal regulations absolutely
control and govern payment of the amount of the bond to
the surviving co-owner by the issuer, the Government, yet
upon payment being received from the Government by
the surviving co-owner, the proceeds of the bond-not the
bond itself-may be impressed with a trust.1 1
It is doubtful whether the federal judiciary would validate an
attempt to impose as Horstman trust upon the proceeds of savings
bonds as part of a Section 11 election. The United States Su-
preme Court struck down an attempt to reach a similar result un-
der a Texas community property law.' 2 The Court reasoned:
If the State can frustrate the parties' attempt to use the
bonds' survivorship provision through the simple expedi-
ent of requiring the survivor to reimburse the estate of the
deceased co-owner as a matter of law, the State has inter-
fered directly with a legitimate exercise of the power of
the Federal Government to borrow money."
3
It would appear that Pennsylvania's Horstman trust would fail for
the same reason the Texas community property approach was
held invalid. To date, few attempts to reach savings bonds through
Section 11 have been made and none have been successful.
114
V. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Legislature has long sought to provide statu-
tory marital property rights which would survive attempted disin-
heriting conveyances. Until the enactment of Section 11 of the Es-
tates Act of 1947, however, a surviving spouse's statutory rights
could effectively be barred by a decedent's conveyance of assets
into a survivorship estate held jointly by the decedent and an-
other. The problem created by this survivorship loophole became
increasingly pressing with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's de-
109. See 31 U.S.C. § 757(c) (1951); 31 C.F.R. § 315.7.
110. 398 Pa. 506, 159 A.2d 514 (1959).
111. Id. at 516, 159 A.2d at 519.
112. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1960).
113. Id. at 669.
114. See, e.g., Hetrick Estate, 42 Pa. D. & C. 2d 582 (C.P. Dauph,
1967); Graham Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 218 (C.P. Del. 1954).
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cision in Maxwell v. Saylor.115 The practical effect of the Max-
well decision was to create a new way for one spouse to defeat the
other's statutory property rights. Although the Maxwell decision
is based upon questionable legal analysis and abstruse consider-
ations of public policy, it continues as law in Pennsylvania.
The objectionable effect of MaxweUl has been overcome through
the enactment of Section 11. The incidents of the joint survivor-
ship estate make property so held subject to spousal election
through Section 11. Property held in a survivorship estate which
was created before the effective date of Section 11 may neverthe-
less be subject to spousal election. It appears that an intestate's
widow may elect against a Section 11 conveyance without losing
the benefit of the spousal share afforded by the Intestate Act of
1947. It does, however, appear that jointly held United States
Savings Bonds are beyond the reach of a Section 11 election.
Section 11 thus embodies a vital portion of the legislature's com-
prehensive spousal protection plan. Its effectiveness, however,
will only continue if the Pennsylvania appellate courts uphold the
county courts in their application of Section 11 to joint survivor-
ship estates. The reasoning of these courts appears sound and
there is thus little reason to expect their decisions to be disturbed
on appeal. The inapplicability of Section 11 to United States Sav-
ings Bonds cannot be changed through state judicial or legislative
action. The savings bond exception should, in practical effect,
work no substantial hardship although isolated cases of abuse are
certain to arise. The cases have indicated that persons seeking to
circumvent the spousal rights are usually concerned with real prop-
erty, bank accounts, or stocks rather than savings bonds. Should
the effectiveness of Section 11 in defeating the now typical avoid-
ance techniques lead to a wholesale resort to the savings bond loop-
hole, Congress may well be forced to reexamine the balance it has
struck between its revenue raising measures and state attempts to
foster social stability.
RUSSELL L. SCHETROMA
115. 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948).
